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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE
STATE OF UTAH
RICHARD DIAMOND & PEGGY
DIAMOND,

)
)

)

Plaintiffs and
Appellants,

)

)
)
)

vs.

Case No. 16642

)

ROBERT E. CHRISTOFFERSON,
RUTH R. CHRISTOFFERSON,
husband and wife, and GLEN
R. CHRISTOFFERSON, LAURA
CHRISTOFFERSON, husband and
wife, and the UNKNOWN WIVES,
DEVICES, HEIRS AND CREDITORS
OF THE ABOVE-NAMED PARTIES
and ALL OTHER UNKNOWN PERSONS
WHO HAVE OR CLAIM TO HAVE
ANY RIGHT, TITLE OR ESTATE,
LIEN OR INTEREST IN THE
PROPERTY DESCRIBED HEREIN,
Defendants and
Respondents.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment
entered by Calvin Gould dated the 15th day of June, 1979,
denying the plaintiff a permanent restraining order.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court refused to grant the plaintiff a permanent restraining order and entered an order holding that
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-2the plaintiffs' property was burdened with a thirty-three
(33) foot right-of-way in favor of the defendants.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondents seek to have this Court affirm the
judgment of Judge Gould.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiffs-appellants, Richard Diamond and his
wife, Peggy Diamond, purchased a parcel of real property
located in Pleasant View, Utah, sometime in 1968.

The

parcel was located on the south immediately adjacent to a
roadway extending from a road known as 900 west in Pleasant
View, running to the east to the property owned by the
respondents.
Subsequently the plaintiffs-appellants purchased an
additional parcel of property this time located on the north
side of the roadway extending to the respondents' property.
That parcel was acquired in approximately 1975 (T99) .
The roadway was not owned by the respondents but was
donated for the construction of the roadway extending from
900 West in Pleasant View to the respondents' property to
the east prior to 1926.
After the appellants acquired the property, Mr. Diamond
caused the fence on the north side of the first parcel he
purchased, to be rebuilt and in the process of rebuilding
the fence, he moved to the north (T224) making the roadway
much narrower.

At the time the appellant moved hi' fence''

j
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into the roadway, although the respondents did not tear it
down, or file a lawsuit, they did talk to him about it.
(T238)
Subsequently when Mr. Diamond, the appellant, bought
the property to the north of the roadway he began changing
the location of the fence on the south side of the land.

He

was installing the fence poles to the south of the fence
line thereby narrowing the roadway from the north.

At that

time the respondents simply removed the fence posts and it
was the removal of the posts that caused the plaintiffsappellants to file their action for temporary restraining
order.
The issues that were presented to the trial court for
determination were:
(1)

When was the roadway constructed?

(2)

What was the width of the roadway?

(3)

What is the width of the roadway to which the

respondents are entitled?
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE
ROADWAY WAS CONSTRUCTED THIRTY-THREE (33)
FEET IN WIDTH IN CALENDAR YEAR 1926.
There were few witnesses available to testify with any
degree of accuracy as to what occurred in 1927, however
there is a living witness to the building of the road, Mr.
Lucien v. Critchlow.

At the time of trial he was 80 years
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&].El ans testified that he knew the father of the defendants
uui that he was familiar with the real property in question

ilil the lawsuit.

of the respondents, hired him to maintain the lane by

~e;r

~lir.L!
~iea

He testified that Ray Christofferson,

reeks, filling it with dirt, etc.

taat he even built the fence.

(Tl76) and testi-

He testified that he

ia,.eip,e:61. bl.lila the roadway in question in the year 1926 and
¥@.'5pa.id 17 or 1S cents an hour .. (Tl78)
'il'rh!.ere
~al ilS

SUBStantial discussion at that point in the

to the admissibility of Mr. Critchlow' s testimony

~erlilinq

*·

WilS

the width of the road.

Defendants' counsel asked

Critchlow, "Give us your best estimate as to the width

H tJue read that you built?" (Tl82)
oajected.

Plaintiffs' counsel

The Court then stated, "He was there and he built

tb.e roaa, and he can give me a judgment.

It may go to the

weight but it is certainly not inadmissible."

The question

wias asked, "In you best estimate Mr. Critchlow, how wide
was the road you built?"
rods."
are?"

Answer, "Well I think it was two

Question, "Do you know how far - how big two rods
To which he responded, "Yes.

feet."

It is thirty-three

Question, "And did the road appear to you to be

thirty-three feet in width?"

Answer, "Yes it did." (Tl82)

Mr. Mac Wade, a long time resident of the area and an
owner of property immediately adjacent to the roadway,
testified that he moved into the neighborhood in 1932 and
when asked hfs opinion as to the distance between the fences
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on the north and south side of the roadway he stated, "Well,
I would just guess thirty-two feet to two rods.
just guess, because I never measured it." (Tl99)

I would
And when

asked, "What is your best estimate as to the width of that
road?"

he responded, "Thirty-three feet." (T200)

Mr. Glen R. Christofferson, one of the respondents,
testified he lived in the family home on the east end of
that roadway in 1925. (T223)

He testified that in 1946 or

1947 that they were going to remove the family home down the
roadway, that the house was 24 feet by 30 feet so he measurea
the distance between telephone poles down along the road to
see whether there would be adequate clearance. (T227)
There was 31 feet between the posts. He further testified
that on the north side of the road, the fence was about two
feet north of the existing telephone poles. He further
stated, "I remember when the power company installed those
poles in 1931.

At that time, when they dug the holes, they
I

was tamping it in, they didn't put it in the fence line."
The question was asked, "They put it in which direction frem
the fence?" to which he responded, "They put the poles
inside the lane."

The question was then asked, "Now, you

say you measured the distance between the telephone poles on
the north and the fence line on the south.
was there?"

How much distance

to which he responded, "From the telephone pole

to the south fence the line was 31 feet." (T228)
rhereafter the Court concluded in his memorandum
decision that the road was thirty-three feet in width and
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taken issue with that finding but it is clearly the testimony of the only person there and he was not speculating or
guessing, that was his best judgment and he also testified
that that is what the adjoining property owners wanted, a
thirty-three foot road.
ARGUMENT
POINT II
THE RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO A PRESUMPTION
'nlAT THEIR USE OF THE ROADWAY AT THIRTY-THREE
(33) FEET WAS ADVERSE TO THE OWNER.
The Utah Supreme Court in Richins vs. Struhs, 17 Utah
2nd 356, 412 P.2nd, 314 clearly establishes where the Defend
have shown that such use existed peaceably without interferertce for 20 years, that the law presumes that its use
was adverse to the owner and that it had a legitimate origin.
The court said,

"The origin and purpose of their recognition
rises out of the general policy of the law
of assuring the peace and good order of
society by leaving a long established status quo
at rest rather than by disturbing it. In order to
serve this purpose, when a claimant has shown t~
such a use has existed peaceably and without
interference for the prescriptive period of 20
years, the law presumes that the use is adverseJQ.
the owner; and that it had a legitimate origin.
The latter presumption is usually placed on the
ground that there was a lawful grant of such
right, but that it had been fictional. But the
theory upon which the presumption rests is not
important. Whatever theor :;_~ may be based u on,
what is signi icant is in conformity with the
t i§.t it has a well 'ustified and salutar pur ose
w ich is in conformit with the well establish~
in our law that its validity is no lon~er open to
question. Consequentl¥ it should be given ef!BI
to prevent the very thing which defen~ants.ha~
attempted here:
the upsetting of a situation
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law which
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-7The Appellants here have misinterpreted the law, it is
not the burden of the Respondents here to establish the
prescriptive use by clear and convincing evidence, they have
a presumption that it is legitimate.

It is up to the

Plaintiff to overcome the presumption by clear and convincing
evidence.
ARGUMENT
POINT III
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE WHATEVER THAT THE RESPONDENTS
HAVE ABANDONED THEIR PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHT OF WAY.
Subsequent to the construction of the roadway in 1926,
the roadway was narrowed from the south lot by Joe Alkema
in 1942.

(T211)

This was the testimony of Mac Wade, who

was the owner of the property on the other side of the road.
At the time Joe narrowed the roadway the Defendants spoke to
him about it but did not attempt to tear up his fence.
(T245)
Each time the roadway was diminished in width, because
of the moving of the fences, the Defendants objected to it.
In approximately 1957, Royal

Buce, the owner of the parcel

to the south of the road, put in a new fence which narrowed
the roadway and again the Defendants talked to him about it
and voiced their objection.

(T237)

In 1968 when Diamond purchased the property and moved
the fence into the roadway again the Defendants registered
their complaint with him, but Diamond ignored them.

(T246)

In 1978 when Diamond started to install the fenceposts on
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from the north, the Defendants had enough and pulled the
fenceposts out which gave rise to this action.
The Appellants have attempted to show that during a
period of time, commencing in 1957, a Mr. Keith Hansen
surveyed the area for Pleasant View Culinary Water Association that the distance between the fences was 19 feet on one
end of the road and 21 feet on the other and have therefore
concluded that the Respondents have abandoned their easement.
This is not a correct statement of the law.

The law is

clearly enunciated in Richards v. Pines Ranch, Inc., 559
P.2d 948, where the Court said at page 949,
"A right-of-way by prescription is
established by open, notorious, adverse use
thereof for a period of twenty years. Once the
adverse use is established for the twenty-year
period, the burden of showing that it was not
adverse is upon the owner of the servient estate."
and the Court continued:
'"If a twenty-year adverse use was established
then that could only be defeated by a prohibition of use for a like period."
(Emphasis added) .
The Utah Supreme Court has spoken on the question of
abandonment in Western Gateway Storage Company vs. Treseder,
567 P.2d, 181, where the Court said at page 182:
"It is well recognized that an easement or right of way may be abandoned.
However, to determine the issue of abandonment
several factors need be considered among which are
whether or not the right was acquired by prescription or grant, the extent of its use, and the
actual intent of the owner.

"This Court has previously recognized that a right
gained by conveyance may not be lost by non-use
alone and that an actual intent to abandon be
ponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library.
Funding for
digitization
by the Institute
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Tuttle v. Sowadzki and fn Riter v. Cayias.
"In regard to the quantum of proof required on the
issue of abandonment, the court was confronted
with the question in connection with a prescriptive easement in Harmon v. Rasmussen and it was
therein determined that the degree of eroof
required was that of clear and convincing actions
releasing the ownership and right of use and an
intentional abandonment, not a mere re onderance
of the evidence.'
Emphasis adde
There is no evidence here that the easement was abandoned,
in fact quite the contrary, when the Appellants narrowed
the roadway by moving the fence line of the south property
to the north, the Respondents objected, the Appellants
apparently ignored their pleas, but in 1978 when the Appellants
again attempted to narrow the roadway from the north, the
Respondents forcibly removed the posts, and it was that act
which precipitated the lawsuit.
If the testimony of Mr. Keith Hansen were true, it
places the width of the road at 19 feet to 21 feet in 1957.
There was no evidence concerning the width at 21 feet or 19
feet at any time prior to 1957.

And in 1968, the Respondents

objected to the narrowing of the roadway, hence there is no
showing that the roadway was diminished in width for the
requisite 20 years.
CONCLUSION
The Court had an opportunity to hear numerous witnesses
involved with the construction and operation of the roadway
in question.

He heard Mr. Critchlow, who is now 80 years

old
butQuinney
had Law
a specific
recollection
of by
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ofLibrary Services
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that road -- he helped build it, he knew how wide it was,
a<mG it was 2 rods in width.
He heard Mac Wade, who became a property owner of the
adjacent property in 1932 and Mr. Wade testified that he too
l9elieved that the property was 2 rods in width.

The testimony

of the :Respondents was consistent.
The Court heard witnesses testify that property owners
p;r.ior to »r. Diamol'l.d had attempted to narrow the roadway by
mevbl·"!J the fence from the south parcel to the north, and
frelll the north parcel to the south, and on each occasion
t.aey oJi>jected to the narrowing of the roadway. The Court saw

ola fence posts and old barb wire marks on trees close to
the roadway.

He saw photographs and heard oral testimony as

to the location of the old fences.

He obviously believed

the witnesses and considered the physical evidence he saw to
be consistent with that testimony.

There was nothing

difficult about the Court's conclusion that the roadway was
indeed 2 rods in width.
Mr. Diamond did not become an owner of the adjacent
property until 1968 and immediately thereafter encroached
further into the roadway from the south and met objections
from the respondents.

When he attempted to encroach into

the roadway from the north, the respondents had had enough.
They then tore the fence posts out, which gave rise to the
lawsuit.
By no stretch of the imagination could the Court have

j

that
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wasprovided
any less
than of2Museum
rods and
inLibrary
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or that the respondents here had in someway acquiesced in
the narrowing of the roadway or abandoned their right of
way.

The respondents had been there for a long time; it was

the appellant who was the newcomer and who wanted to change
the old fence lines to increase the size of his parcels of
property.
The Court's decision was logical and it was fair and it
ought to be sustained.
Respectfully submitted this

Attorne
or Defendants
R pendents
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